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Feticide' and Criminal Law:
Is There an Acceptable Approach?

INTRODUCTION

Veronica and Dale have lived together for two years. Their relationship has always been a bit rodry,
and within the last few months most of their conversations have degenerated into arguments. Very recently
those arguments have become increasingly heated. Financial trouble is one source of conflict, and the
prospect of parenthood has only compounded their troubles. Veronica is pregnant, and Dale is angry about

A

it. To make matters worse, Dale lost control of his drinking problem around the time he learned of her
pregnancy. He then resumed the habit he had abandoned just before they met, dr&ng

heady every day.

A few days ago Veronica and Dale had an especially bad fight. An argument about money and the

baby they were expecting quickly turned volatile, both of then screaming obscenities at each other and
gesruring threateningly. The fight ended when he threw an empty vodka bode at her. She dodged the bode,
which barely missed her head, hit some books on a bookshelf, bounced off, and fell to the flmr, making a
hollow sound as it hit the carpa. They were both shocked at what he had just done. There had been ugly
fights before, but there had never been violence. Drunk and ashamed, he crept into the bedroom and fell
down on the bed She was scared of him now, so she left their house and went to her mother's.
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' Because much of the language used to discuss this subject is politically charged, the term "feticide" and the phrase
" k h g of a fetus" have the same meaning. Both sig+ acts, other than abonion, that cause the development of the
fetus to end, resulting in stillbirth or miscarriage. By using neutral language, the author wishes to avoid making any
conclusions about the ethical status of fetuses.

After three nights at her mother's house, she moved back in with him. He said he had stopped

drinking, and she believed him. But he was not telling the truth, and two days latex another fight erupted.

n,
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The same argument descended into more violence. He grabbed her and threw her to the ground when she
told him she was leaving for good She struggled to get up and began running towards the door, but he
caught up with her in the kitchen and pushed her into the counter. She hit the counter hard and fell to the
floor. Soon there were sirens and flashing lights outside their house. The police arrested him and took him
to jail. An ambulance put her on a stretcher and took her to the hospital, where an ultrasound confinned her
worst fears. The collision with the counter ended the life that was developing inside her.

This hypothetical raises important ethical and legal issues. An inmal legal question is, how will the
district attorney charge Dale? This will depend on many factors that have little to do with the substantive

uimina law in the jurisdiction where Dale is charged. But the criminal law of that jurisdiction is profoundly
important with respen to the charges that could be fded against Dale. The district attorney sureb has the
power to charge Dale with battery and possibly aggravated battery. In some jutisdictions, there are special
st-

that attach criminal penalties to domestic abuse.
Charging questions also arise from the miscarriage Dale caused. Is Dale crirmnah/ liable for causing

the death of the fetus? The answer depends on the law of the jurisdiction where Dale is charged, and this
paper will describe the three basic approaches American jurisdictions have a d o p d Description of the
existing law in any jurisdiction invites an evaluation of the law. Does the state have an interest in extending its
criminal law to protect developing fetuses and the pregnant women who cany them?2 If so, should conduct
that causes the death of a fetus be c r i m i n W > This paper will also evaluate the approaches.
Although some American jurisdictions share answers to these questions, their approaches differ.

Many American jurisdictions have answered these questions affirmatively, c r i m i n h g the killing of fetuses,
but their approaches to the problem are disparate. Of those American jurisdictions that classify the killing of
a fetus as a form of homicide, some classify it as murder, while others classify it as manslaughter. Some have
I

cr;ninalized it through legislation, some through judicial decisions. Some use their criminal law to protect all
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fetuses. Others protect only viable fetuses or quick fetuses. Still others have statutes that define the crime as

n

assault on a pregnant woman Many American jurisdictions have not extended their criminal law to protect
fetuses or to provide special protection for pregnant women In those states, the law provides no additional

criminal penalty for the killing of a fetus or the assault on a pregnant woman.
The approach a jurisdiction chooses will have profound consequences for individuals who find
themselves entangled in its crimina justice system, either as defendants or victims. For example, the futures
of Veronica and Dale will hmge on the approach their jurisdiction has adopted In addition to the individual
consequences, the various approaches present imponant theoretical issues. Some of these issues are confined
to the field of

c r i d law. For example, should the law focus on mens rea or rely solely on the result of the

proscribed conduct in derermining penalties? Applyng this question to the hypotherical, should Dale be
punished less severely if he did not intend to harm the fetus or should his punishment be based solely on the
fact that the fetus was destroyed as a result of his conduct.?
Other, less obvious theoretical issues are far more complex and difficult. These are the broader

,n,

ethical issues. Is a fetus a person with rights, a person who is entitled to the same level of respect as the
newborn infant,child, or adult? If a fetus does in fact become a person before birth, at.what stage of
pregnancy does the fetus become a person? Answering those questions requires an examination of our most
deeply held philosophical and religious beliefs. Specific answers to these questions are embedded in the
various approaches, and those answers will have far-reaching d c a t i o n s both inside'-and.outside the
boundaries of the criminal law. It is no coincidence that these are the same ethical questions that opposing
sides of the abomon fight continue to debate with such vigor. The legal and ethical questions surrounding
feticide have become another front in the war over abomon. Rather than arguing that one approach is best
because its foundation is the proper ethical position on the moral status of fetuses, this paper will take a
n

d position on that issue. Instead, this paper will examine the approaches in order to determine if any

one of them is acceptable to reasonable people on both sides of the abomon debate.

n

.

In the interest of clarity, the term "fetus" means the product of human reproduction at all stages prior to birth More
precise terminology wiU be used when necessary.

I

Space limitations make a pprehensive description, analysis, and evaluation of the approaches
n

impossible. Rather than attempting a superficial discussion of each approach, this paper describes, anayZes,
and evahmes the three basic approaches. The three approaches are: killing a fetus is not a crime under the
common law born alive rule, killing a fetus is a form of criminal homicide, and killing a fetus is a criminal
assault on a pregnant woman. Because there is little variation among the states that adhere to the born alive
rule, the paper will use legal sources from more than one jurisdiction in the course of discussing that rule.
Although selection of one jurisdiction to represent the homicide jurdictions was difficult, California is the
best choice because the law of that state is both influential and developed This paper will use New Mexico
law to represent the assault jurisdictions, mostly because the author and the potential readers have a special
interest in the law of that jurisdiction. Following the description and evaluation of the three approaches, the
conclusion makes recommendations in light of the discussion.

THE THREE BASIC APPROACHES

1. T h e Common Law Born Alive Rule: Feticide is n o t a Criminal Offense

The importance of the common law born alive rule is twofold First,it is prevalenr; in twenty-five
states it continues to bar crimid prosecutions for conduct causing the death of a fetus.. A simple
quantimive breakdown will give the reader a sense of where American jurisdictions currently stand Half of
the fifty states have neither extended their homicide laws to cover the killing of a fetus nor attached additional
penalties to assaults on pregnant women. Twenty-three of those states have extended their criminal law
through legislation.) In addition, two of those states have done so by jdcid decision.4 In the remaking
twenty-five, the common law born alive rule precludes criminal liab'ity for feticide. The importance of the
bom alive rule transcends its modem prevalence because every American jurisdiction followedthe born alive
Paul Benjamin Linton, PkmndPmndxuiu C k q : :7he F1ight~'i~mRearol
in the 3qnm.v Oxnt, 13 St. Louis U.Pub.L.
Rev. 15, 102 (1993).
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rule at one time. Although other approaches had been used at early common law, "[bk the mid-nineteenth
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century . . . the common law had shifted to the 'born alive' theory."5 So this approach also has historical
import. The born alive rule provides a viral piece of the legal context of this problem, although that context

is much too rich for this paper to discuss full.6
According to the born alive rule, a fetus can never be the victim in a homicide case. C0utt.s often
quote Coke's formulation of the old common law rule:

If a woman be quick wirh childe, and by a potion or orhenvise killeth it in her wombe, or if a
man beat her, whereby the childe dyeth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead childe,
rhis is a great misprision, and no murder, but if the childe be born alive and dyeth of the
potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder; for in law it is accounted a reasonable
creature, in remm natura, when it is born alive?
Coke's distinction is pertinent because it is the distinction embodied in the modem formulation of the rule.
The first part of this passage describes both abortion and feticide, which are both classified as "great
misprisions" or misdemeanors. The second part classifies the killing of a child that has been bom alive as
/7

murder. In Staa?u Wtll,
the New Mexico Court of Appeals announces the rule in modern Engltsh:

m e unborn child is not a human being and hence cannot be the victim of homicide unless
it is subsequently born alive. Early cases under the rule r e q u d a complete live birth as
evidenced by an independent circulation. The rule was rather ambiguous, however, since
there was no recognized standard of what constituted a live b i d or an independent.
circulation.8
As that passage suggests, the rule's ambiguity led to much litigation on the issue of exauly when live b i d
occurred, but those fine distinctions are not

crucial to this discussion. The crucial point is that homicide law

protected no fetus; the age of the fetus and its level of development were both irrelevant at common law.
Under the born alive rule, there was no legal person or human being until a live birth occurred

,'--.

State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984), Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984), and
Commonwealthv. h e n c e , 536 N.E.2d 571 &lass. 1989).
5 State v. W&, 652 P.2d 1222,1223 (NMCtApp. 1982).
6 For a concise history of the law in this area, sae Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County,470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
7 State v. Hammet, 384 S.E.2d 220,221 (GaCtApp. 1989), quoring 3 Coke, inrriam?s58 (1648).

Two examples of how c o w have applied the born alive rule will facilitate a clearer u n h d i n g of
the rule's meaning in modem times and the importance of the rule even in states that no longer adhere to it.
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Two examples follow. The f
m is a homicide prosecution that failed because of the born alive rule. The
second is a homicide prosecution that succeeded despite the born alive rule.

In St& u W&, defendant was charged with killing an unborn viable fetus under New Mexico's
vehicular homicide statute, which states, "Homicide by vehicle is the kijliflg of a human being in the unlawful

operation of a motor vehide."9 The mal court dismissed the vehicular homicide charge on the grounds that
an unborn viable fetus is not a human being for the purposes of the statute.10 The state argued that the
legislature "intend[ed] a viable fetus to be included within the definition of human being as found in the
Vehicular Homicide Statute because of its existence in the New Mexico abomon statute."1t

The state

reasoned "that the abomon statute demonstrates the Legislauue's compelling interest to protect the life of a

The New Mexico Court of Appeals accepted the premise that the state has an interest "in protecting
the life of an unborn child," but rejected the state's conclusion that feticide is "the statutory equivalent of
homicide."l) The court noted that the existence of a state interest does not necessarily mean that the
legislature has chosen to exercise its power to legislate to protect that interest." The court observed that in

this instance the legislature had not exercised that powerJ5 The court looked to the history of homicide law
to discover the legislative intent with respect to the term "human being." In the mid-nineteenth century, the
legislature enacted statutes that distinguished between "the killing of a human being and the killing of an

unborn infant childn16 In 1963, the legislature repealed the law that made it a crime to kill an unborn infant
child and did not change the statutory defdtion of human being." Based on these historical facts, the court

W&

at 1223, quoting

Crimid Law-Homicide-Fetus, 23 Vanderbii Law Rev. at 854.

NM. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-101(A)(Ivlichie 1978).
10

Wdisat 1223.

11 Id.
12

Id.

13 Id.
14

Id.

15 Id
16

17

Id. at 1122.
Id.

-.
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concluded that the legislature did not intend viable fetuses to fall within the meaning of the term "human
being" in the homicide statute.18
In the absence of legislation, the court was unwilling to change the definition of "human being," and

the born alive rule governed the case. The court reiterated the frequently cited separation of powers principle
that expanding the scope of uiminal statutes is a function reserved for the legislalue.19 Writing for the court,
Judge Neal concluded, "Only the legislature can decide to equate the two [feticide and homicide1 and until
they decide to do so there is no basis upon which to impose homicide sanctions for the destruction of
fenrs."zo The appellate court affixmed the uial court's dismissal of the vehicular homicide charge, adhering to
the born alive rule, which served as the default position because the legislature had not expressly abandoned
or amended it.
As discussed below, a defendant in W W position could face criminal penalties for causing the death
of a fetus under current New Mexico law. However, changes in the law do not diminish the importance of
cases like W&, where a homicide prosecution fails as a result of the born alive rule. They are still good law

r'

in many jurisdictions. In addition, much publicin/ often surrounds these cases, o h stirring public debate
and prompting legislative reaction For example, the reasoning in K&

u &,term Gnut cfAmmdor Chu@l

echoes the reasoning in W&. In Kealer, the California Supreme Court held that an unborn viable fetus is not
a "human beingn for the purposes of Califomia's murder statute.= In response to K&,

GKfomia's

legislature amended its criminal code by extending its homicide provision to includes fetuses, and the
California Supreme Court held that the term "fetus" in the homicide provision could include seven-week-old
fetuses.u F i , these types of born alive cases have serious implications for the ethical and legal debate
about abortion. Implicit in their holdings is the propasition that fetuses are not human beings, a statement
that contradicts the fundamental premise of most antiabomon/pro-life arguments.

id.
Id. at 1223.
20 Id.
" 470 P.2d 617 (California 1970). That case and the subsequent dweloprnent of Californialaw will be discussed below
in the section on California's approach to the feticide problem.
'8
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2 K&at
23

618.

People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 599 (Cal. 1994).

Modem cases where a homicide prosecution succeeds despite the application of the born alive rule

n

are also sigdcant. Such cases define the outer limits of the born alive rule by cimumaibing the class of

victims the rule protects. For example, in St& u

Ha24

the issue before the Georgia Court of Appeals

was whether a murder by vehicle charge was lawful for a defendant who i n j j a pregnant woman, causing

in utero injuries to her fetus that ultimately resulted in its death after it was born alive. The court described
the facts in that case:
Appellee lost control of her car and collided with a vehicle in which Sarah Fergoson was a
passenger. Ferguson was thuty-five weeks pregnant at the time. Ferguson was transported
to a hospital and gave birth, through an emergency Caesarian section, to Isaac Ferguson
T o h c h . The child lived approximately eleven hours before dying from the injuries he had
received in the accident, pnmanly internal hemorrhaging and a fractured right davicle.25
The nial court relied on the born alive rule and dismissed the charge, ruling that the viaim was not a
'person" at the time of the accident26 But the appellate court rejected the uial court's reasoning and
reversed.Y -The wurt of appeals held that the victim in this case was "a legal 'person' at the time he died
-\

from injjes received in the automobile collision."=

The point of *em

in Iimrmett was not whaher to use the born alive rule but how to use it.

The uial wurt construed the rule narrowly and ruled that the victim was not yet born alive at the time of the
injuty, which led it to the conclusion that c r i m d homicide was an impossibility. However, the appellate
court consuued the rule broadly and held "that it is not the victim's
that determines the nature of the aime

. . . but the victim's

status at the time the injuries are intlicted

status at

the time of death which is the

determinative factor."29 The appellate court's reading is correct because the narrow reading is inconsistent
with homicide law. All homicides share a result, the death of a human being. In murder and manslaughter

cases, if the defendant has the requisite mens rea and actus reus and his conduct causes the death of a human

384 S.E.2d 220 (GaCtApp. 1989),
Id. at 220.
26 Id.
z7Id.
2' Id.* 221.
Id.
2'

25
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being, the defendant is &ty of criminal h0rnicide.N The born alive rule states that a fetus becomes a human
being once born alive, so if the mens rea and actus rea are p-t,

the defendant must be d t y . But the

namxv reading makes legal guilt impossible, and there is no satisfactory justification for this anomaly.

On the other hand, the broad reading is arbitrary and could have absurd consequences. Consider the
following hypotheticals. Each of two defendants kicks a pregnant woman in the abdomen, causing the death
of a nine-month-old fetus. The prosecutor can prove that both defendants meet all the conduct and mental
state elements for f k d e g r e e murder. The only difference is that defendant one's victim was born alive,
lived for an hour, and then died, while defendant two's victim died in utero. Under the expansive reading of
the born alive rule, defendant one is exposed to no aimina liability for intentionally causing the death of a
nine month old fetus, but defmdant two is exposed to the &urn

amount of criminal liability possible

under American law. This is a distinction without a principled difference, but the p o d consequences for
the two defendants are extremely different. As subsequent discussion wiU make clear, every approach to this
problem suffers from the infirmiry of arbitrariness. Because the criminal law must take an approach, such
P

infirmities are not fatal.
The f k sigdicant problem with the born alive rule is that one of the original reasons for its
existence may

now be a reason to abandon it and attach criminal liability to feticide. A widely recogwed

reason for the rule was the level of development of medical knowledge and technology when the rule
originated. Medical science was not advanced enough at that time to make the sorts of determinations
required for uiminal homicide cases involving fetuses. Determining whether a fetus was alive at any point
during the pregnancy was impossible. In H+w.

S e * ,a case in which the Oklahoma Coutt of Giminal

Appeals abandoned the born alive rule, the court wrote, "The born alive rule was necessitated by the state of

medical technology is earlier centuries. The health of a child within the womb could not be determined until
the child was observed after b i d " " That historical circumstance made it impossible to prove causation until
there was a live binh. Although medical science has not yet made causation a non-issue in feticide cases,

/"-'

Many of the complexities of the criminal law of homiade are irrelevant to this discussion and are therefore excluded;
these indude excuses and justifications.
3'

868 P.2d 730 (OklaGimApp. 1994).

medical knowledge and rechnology are advanced enough tcday to determine whether the fetus was alive at

?

the time of the alleged criminal conduct and to determine the cause of the feral death in most cases. The

H+

court writes, "Advances in medical technology have abolished the need for the born alive rule."33

In addition to these practical lusdfications, the bom alive rule contains its own simple ethical
justification. However, an examination of the logic of the ethical argument supporting the born alive d e
reveals that the fundamental ethical proposition underiying the rule does not unavoidably lead to the
conclusion that feticide should not be criminalized People who agree with the proposition that a fetus is not
a human being until it is born alive may be compelled to conclude that feticide should not be a crime, that the
criminal law should not extend its protection to fetuses. Indeed, the born alive rule is founded on the
proposition that no fetus is a human being until born alive. Assuming that no fetus is a human being, it
would be morally wrong to convict someone of homicide for lulling a fetus.
However, accepting that arpment does not lead inevitablyto the conclusion that feticide should.not
be a crime. :If no fetus is a human being, then feticide is not homicide, but feticide may be some other crime.
?

It follows that the criminal law need not take a position in the current debate about whether fetuses are
human beings in order to protect them; it is possible to crirninh feticide without classdying it as homiade.

Unlike the debate about abortion, this debate involves no balancing of interests.

By definition, criminal

feticide law need not balance a pregnant woman's privacy interest with the state's interest in protecting
unborn fetuses."

In fact, the interests of pregnant women and state's interest will almost always coincide;

.

b x h the pregnant woman and the state have an interest in prorecting unborn fetuses. Reasonable people on
both sides of the abomon debate can surely agree that a pregnant woman has an interest in protecting the life
of her fetus, whether or not they believe that the fetus is a human being. If a pregnant woman has an interest
in protecting herself and her unborn fetus, then the

state surely has

an interest in protecting a pregnant

woman and her unborn fetus from criminal attacks. So those who believe that a fetus is not a human being
need not support the born alive rule in order to maintain a consistent ethical framework It makes perfect

32 Id

at 732.

Id.
I'

SBe Srate v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990).

?
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sense to say, "I do not believe fetuses are m o d or legal persons, but the state has an interest in attaching
criminal penalties to the killing of a fetus without the mother's consent."
This evaluation suggests that the time has come to abandon the born alive rule and crirrdnalize
feticide, but that does not solve the problem entirely. The decision to replace the born alive rule leads directly
to another difficult issue. How should the law fill the gap left by the born alive rule? In order w answer that
question, it is necessary to discuss the two basic approaches that American jurisdictions have adopted to
determine if either is satisfactoq-. Should killing a fetus be a form of criminal homicide? Or should it be
classified differently, as some other type of crime?

2. California: Feticide is Criminal H o m i c i d e

Before discussing the California approach, the reader should be aware of what is beyond the scope of

this discussion. First, it is important to note that California's law in this area is not truly representative of the

r.

twenty-one states that classify feticide as a form of homicide?s In fact, an examination of the criminal
feticide law of any one of those states would not lead to a thorough undemanding of the wide Mliety of
approaches taken by the states that classify feticide as a form of homicide. As noted in the induction,
there are many variables, including the point of fetal development when homicide law begins to apply, the
penalty attached to a conviction for feticide, the level of mens rea the law requires, and the applicabhy of

doctrines liked e r r e d intent and the felony-muder rule. At this lwd of detail, the selection of California
law may appear arbitrary, but California law is both influential and developed, which makes it a logical choice

forthe ppurpses of this discussion.
Second, this discussion will nor include all of the constitutional challenges defendants have made
against laws that classify feticide as criminal homicide. Two reasons support this limitation. The fm is that
courts have rejected most of those challenges, and it appem that states have the power to consider feticide a

,p

See Benjamin, supm note 3, for list of state statutes and code provisions that classify feticide as a form of uiminal
homicide.
'5

form of homicide. The second reason is the narrow scope of this paper, although i n t e k g , the failed

?

challenges are at the periphery of this topic.

In order to understand California's current approach to criminal feticide, one must be aware of the
kqr legal events that have shaped California law on the subject. The event that precipitated the major change
in California's approach was kkhu Supoior Cam cfhmb C i . In In&,

the issue before the California

Supreme Court was "whether an unborn but viable fetus is a 'human being' within the meaning of the
California statute defining murder."J6 In 1970, when Ka?ler was decided, the California murder statute was
d b l e . It read, "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethoughtnJ7
Defendant was charged with murder for the killing of a fetus and sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the
prosecution from pmceedhg?s
A summary of the most u u d faas of i(eakr follows. Mr. and Ms. Keeler were divorced in

September of 196829 Mr. Keeler was awarded custody of their two daughten, and Ms. Keeler had visitation
rights"

In Februaty of 1969, Mr. Keeler encountered his ex-wife on a mountain road and blocked the road

with his car,forcing her to pull over.+' Defendant waked up to her vehicle said,"I hear you're pregnant If
you are you had better stay away from the girls and frmn here."" She did not respond,and he opened the car
door and "assisted" her out of the

car.43

He then became "extrunely upsetn when he saw that she was

pregnant.# Then he said, "You sure are. I'm going to stomp it out of youq5 He then pushed her into the
car,kneed her in the abdomen, and hit her in the face several times." "When she regained consciousness" he
was gone"

At the hospital,

an

in utero examination of the fetus revealed that its head was "severely

'6Kmlerat 618.
CZI. Penal Code § 187(a) (West 1872) (amended 1970).
3' Kmlerat 619.
9 Id at 618.
37

Id.
Id
42 Id
Id
44 Id
* Id
46 Id
47 Id
4'

"

?
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fractured," and it was delivered stillborn?8 A pathologist opined that force applied to the mother's abdomen

could have caused the f a d inju1y.*9The evidence suggested that the fetus was between 28 and 36 weeks old,
and experts concluded with a reasonable degree of medical certainty "that the fetus had developed to the
stage of viability, i.e., that in the event of premature bitth on the date in question it would have had a 75
percent to 96 percent chance of survival."%

In a five to two decision, the California Supreme Court conduded that a viable fetus was not a
human being for the purposes of the murder statute and granted Mr. Keeler's request for a writ of
prohibmon.51 Writing forthe court, Justice Mosk held that the legislature did not intend for a viable fetus to

fall within the definition of human being.52 He traced the legislative history of the statute and concluded that
the legislature must have been aware of the common law born alive rule and that by using common law
language in the statute, the legislature was adopting the born alive rule.53 Finally, he rejected the state's
argument that the court should abandon the born alive rule." Mosk agreed with the premise that advances in
obstetrics and pediauics had obviated the need for the born alive rule, but he held that due process principles
-,

prohibit courts from expanding the meaning of criminal sratutes.55
In his dissenting opinion, A&g Chief Justice Burke wrote, "the majority ignore sipficant common
law precedents, frustrate the express intent of the Legislature, and defy reason, logic and common sense."56
He argued that quickened fetuses were considered human beings at common law and, therefore, the
legislature must have intended for the term human being to encompass quickened fetuses.". -Despite this
conclusion about legislative intent, Burke did not think that quickening should mark the boundary between
fetuses that are human beings and fetuses that are not.58 He wrote:

Id.
Id.
M Id. at 619.
5' Id. at 618.
Id.
53 Id. at 619-24.
Id. at 624.
55 Id at 618,624, 625.
56 Id. at 630.
48
'9

"
"
n,

li. at 631.
interesting aside, as late as 1993 five states classified the killing of a quidrened f e r n uiminal homicide according
to Benjamin, s u p , at note 3.
57

58 AS an

I do not suggest that we should interpret the term "human being" in our homicide statutes
in t e n of the common law cor~&ptof quickening. At one time, that concept had a value
in differenriating, as accurately as was then scientifically possible, between life and nonlife.
The analogous concept of viabiliry is clearly more satisfactory, for it has a well defined and
medically determinablemeaning denoting the ability of the fetus to live or survive apart from
its mother.59
Therefore, he concluded, the court should have ruled that viable fetuses fall within the meaning of the term
human being in the homicide statute. Although there is much more to Burke's dissent, this summary
captures the part of his argument that is important for the p s e s of this discussion.
The California Legislature reacted to the k&r decision the year it was decided, amending the murder
statute to read, "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforerhought"60 A
reaction was foreseeable; the result in k&r must have appeared unjust. Keeler had b n d l y assaulted his exwife, i n t e n t i o causing
~
the death of a fetus that was at least six months old, yet his punishment could not
exceed the punishment meted out to any other defendant convicted of assault. The California legislature
attempted to prevent a K&--type
statute, but

situation from recurring by adding the word "fetus" to the homicide

%
-

because of disagreement among members of the legislature, "the term 'fetus' was deliberately left

undefmed."6' Because of that ambiguity, the amended murder StaMe has left an interesting but troubling
wake.
Until 1994 the trial coum and appellate courts of California interpreted the term "fetus" to mean
viable fetus. Published opinions from the courts of appeals consistently read a viability requirement into the
murder statute.62 In the fm of those cases, PBDP)eu S d (7GdA&),

the appellate court held that only

viable fetuses fall within the meaning of the term fetus for the purposes of the homiade statute.63 The S d
court m e :

s9K&at

631.

Cal. Penal Code § 187(a) (West 1998). § 187(b) explicitlyprovides that legal abomon is not murder.
61 People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591,594 ('3
1994).
.
62 See People v. Smith (Karl Andrew), 129 CalRptr. 498 (1976), People v. Apodaca, 142 CalRptr. 830 (1978), People v.
Smith (Robext Porter), 234 CalXptr. 142 (1987), and People v. Henderson,275 CalRpu. 837 (1990).
6'

Smirh &ad A&)

at 502.

,-

We, therefore, construe section 187 as making its protection coextensive with the capability
for independent human life, a concept embraced within the term viabiity.
If future
medical arr succeeds in further lowering the age of viability, then the protection of the
statute will foUow, for it protects human life at the stage it has achieved the capability for
independent exiscence.M

...

The court relied on the reasoning and principles of Roeu W&J in reachingthis conclusion, writing:
The underlymg rationale of WacEe,therefore, is that until viability is reached, human life in
the legal sense has not come into existence. Implicit in Wak.is the conclusion that as a
matter of ~ 0 ~ s t i t u d o
law
d the destruction of a non-viable fetus is not a taking of human
life. It follows that such destruction cannot constitute murder or other form of homicide,
..
.
whether committed by a mother, a father (as here), or a third person."
,

Subsequent appellate decisions continued to

require

viabiltry, and the California Supreme Court did not

consider the issue until 1994, when it decided Peoples D m k . 6 7
At trial, Davis was conviaed of murder for causing the stillbirth of a fetus that was no older than 25
weeks.u The jwy found that Davis shot Ma& Flores while robbing her and that Flores' injuries resulted in a
n

stillbirth the next day. Whether Davis acted with malice aforethought was not an issue in the case because
the prosecution proceeded under a felony-murder theory with robbery as the underlying felony? Ahhough
both the prosecution expert and the defense expert found that there was some possibility that the fetus could

have survived independent of the mother, neither testified that its wmival was probab1e.m Following the
holdings of several appellate court decisions, the trial judge i

n

d the jwy that viability was a legal

requhment and that a possibility of survival satisfied that requknent.71 The jury found Davis guilty of

murder, and he was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole plus five years for murder, assault,
robbery, and using a firearm in the commission of those crimes.72

M

Id

" 410 U.S.113 (1973).
"Smih &tdAmkw) at 503.
67
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People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 at 594 (Cal. 1994).

Idat 593.
Id at 618.

Id.
Id.
72 Id.
70

71

On appeal, Davis argued that viability meant a probabii of survival under Rmu Wade, x
m a mere
possibility73 The People argued that viability was not a requirement of the murder statute, so that any
argument about the viability instruction was irrelevant."

-

The California Court of Appeals accepted the

People's argument, holding that the murder statute does not require that a fetus be viable75 ?he Dam
appellate decision reversed the course of Chlifornia law, which had consistently held that viability was an
elanent of fetal murder.
Although the Coutt of Appeals rejected Davis' argument, it r e v 4 his conviaion because irs
holding was contrary to then &g

precedent. The coun reasoned that convicting him under its holding

would violate Davis' due process rights; application of the new rule would be an unconstitutional ex post
facto law76 The Court of Appeals held that the new construction of the murder statute would apply
prospectively only and that the trial judge's instructions were erroneous and p r e p d i d to Davis.77
The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and took the
oppormnity to clarify the current state of California homicide law.78 Writing for the court, Chief Justice
Lucas discussed the histoxy of California law in the area, noting that evexy appellate c o w had read a viabiity

requirement into the Statute but that the Supreme Court had never addressed the viability issue before." The
court rejected defendant's argument that the California murder

statute

applies only to viable fetuses as

defmed by Rceu Wade. Obsenring that the state has an inrerest in protecting the lives of developing fetuses,
the court concluded "that when the mother's privacy interests are not at stake, the Legislature may determine
whether, and at what point, it should protect life inside a mother's womb from homicide."" Put differently,

the c o w concluded that California had the power to dassify f&cide as homicide and to decide at what stage
of fetal development homicide penalties attach.

73

id at 593-4.

Id at 594.
People v. Davis, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 96, 104 (CalApp.4h 1993).
' 6 Id at 108.
Id at 109.
78 People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591,594 (Cal. 1994).
"Id at 596.
'W Id at 599.
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The question then became whether the legislature had exercised its power to indude nonviable
-'r

fetuses as potentid victims under the murder statute. In other words, what does the word *fetusn mean for
the pwposes of the California murder statute? The court recognized that the legislature did not agree on a
defdtion of f w there was no statutory definition.81 Then the court held that life developiig within the
uterus becomes a fetus at age seven or eight weeks with no further discussion.82 The corn relied on the
definition of fetus contained in a medical-legal dictionary; its determination did not rest on any stature,
legislative history, case law, or policy arguments. Nevertheless, the court reversed Davis' conviction because
it agreed with the Court of Appeals that the new interpretation of the murder statute was a significant change

in the law that should be applied only prospectiveb.83
Justice Mosk's dissenting opinion in D& is an excellent startjng point for evaluating the Da*
decision and the current state of California law in this area He argued that the legislature intended to include
a viability requkment in the murder statute. Justice Mosk noted that the issue in Dais was one of statutory
interpretation, so an examination of the legislative history and the historical circumstances sumomding the
,-

enactment of the stanlre were the touchstones of the analysis. Justice Mosk authored the controversial lead
opinion in K&,

the case that prompted the legislature to amend the California murder statute to include

fetuses. As a key player in K&, Justice Mosk had a special knowledge of its facts and aftermath, and he used
that knowledge as the basis for his dissent in Dauis.
He began by noting that the inclusion of the word fetus in the statute was a direct result of the Ke&
decision, and argued that the meaning of "fetus" must be determined in the context of that decision.8' Justice
Mosk argued that the facts of i(a?kr limit its holding, and K&

involved the killing of a viable fetus.85 He

concluded that ZGmb held "that the Legislature did not intend that Robert Keeler's act of maliciously killing
an 'unborn but viable' fetus be prosecuted as murder under section 187."86 In support of this conclusion, he
reasoned that both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion in K&
8'

Id.

82 Id

Id at 600.
Id at 607-8.
85 Id at 608.
83

r,

8'

focused on the viability of the

fetus."

Justice Mosk then surmnarized the legislative response to K&,

noting that the legislature was

n.

attempting to amend the statute so as to prevent the next defendant in Keeler's posiion from escaping
homicide liabdity for killing a viable ferus.88 By amending the murder statute in response to Ke&, the
legislam
extended the crime of murder, as IG& refused to do, to include the malicious killing of a
viable fetus. To read that amendment as further extending murder to include the MLng of
even a nonviable fetus, as the lead opinion does now, is to ignore the facts and holding of
IG&and the direct legislative response they so plainly triggered89
Justice Mosk's analysis of the legislative history is more complete than Chief Justice Lucas'. Although the
amended statute does not expressly conrain a viability requirement, the history of the amendment suggests
that a fetus must be viable to be a victim under California's murder statute.
Justice Mosk bumessed that reasoning with another persuasive statutory construction argument. He
summarized the California case law interpreting the amended murder statute and noted that in every case the

c o w have held that the stature contains a viability r e q h e n t . m He argued that since the fim of those
cases, "the Legislature has m a 18 times but has taken no step to overmle that holding by what would be a
. .

simple amendment to the statute."9l According to Justice Mosk, the legislature probably acquiesced because
it took no action to reverse those holdings.92 Although legislative acquiescence is not always a strong
argument, in this case it is extremely persuasive given the legislature's reaction to KC&, which it quickly
reversed by statutory amendment. If the legislature disagreed with the appellate courts' interpretation of the

amended statute, "surely it would have spoken again,and equally vigorously."9f
In addition, Justice Mosk argued that the court's reading of the murder statute could have absurd
consequences, which the legislam must not have intended D&

is such an absurd consequence according

to Justice Mosk. Davis is "the Grsr reported case in California in which a person has been convied of f e d
"Id at 610.
87 Id at 609.
88 Id
89 Id at 610.
Wid at 610-11.
9'Id

*Id

at 611.
at 612.

-
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murder without knowing or having reason to know of the existence of the victim.*

Mr. Davis neither knew

nor had reason to know that Ms. Flores was pregnant, so he could not have intended to kill her fetus with
malice and premeditation, yet he was convicted of fim degree murder, a capital offense.95 In combination

with the felony-murder rule, the Dmi holding leads to overly harsh

results, d t s

that set punishments

disproportionate to moral culpabiity,
Justice Mod& felony-mwder rule argument is persuasive statutory interpretation in support of his

condusion that the W o r n i a Legislature did not intend to indude nonviable fetuses in the amended rmurler
statute.

H
i
s argument suggests that D& was wrongly decided In addition, it is a pemasive policy argument

against classifying feticide of a nonviable fetus as murder.

However, that argument cannot assist one in derermining whether killing a viable fetus should be
classified as murder. As noted above, the goal of this paper is to dexermine which a p p d rests on the most
sound policy foundation, not which approach has discovered the uue ethical status of fetuses. The homicide
- approach is not

P.

flawed because it wrongly equates fetuses and human beings, and it is not sound because it

correctly equates the two. It would be arrogant to uy to persuade the reader of the correctness of either
proposition. The reader knows his or her opinion about whether fetuses are human beings, and this paper
will not change that opinion.

However, regardless of what one believes about the moral status of fetuses, the homicide approach is
fundamentally flawed because it attaches severe aimina penalties and stigmatkation to the killing of a.fetus,

an entity whose moral status is at best unclear to society as a whole. In other words, the homicide approach
itself embodies legal arrogance of the most dangerous s o It~is arrogant because it prodaims certainty with
respect to an issue about which our society is uncertain. Although individuals hold definite opinions about

the moral status of fetuses, our society is nowhere near reaching a consensus on the issue. America has not
yet decided whether a fehls is a human being, and, if so, at what point a fetus becomes a human being.

>-,

Id.
Id at 616.
95 Id at 617.
93

94

America may never reach a consensus, but that does not justify a legal solution that elides the difficulty of the

9

issue and the resulting disagreement.
Arrogance alone might not be a serious enough flaw to justify rejecting the homicide approach, but
its profoundly dangerous consequences make it unacceptable. The lives and liberty of cidzens are at stake,
and they must not depend on the whimsical legal resolution of a profound ethical dilemma about which
society as a whole is agnostic. Although many individual cidzens may have no moral qualms about placing a
person in prison for life or execudng a person for kdhng a fetus, society experiences collective ethical nausea,
not because the punishment is necessady wrong but because it is not necessady right. The punishment the
criminal law metes out should embody our collective ethical judgment whenever possible, and punishment
fails that test when it embraces one of two diarneuically opposed approaches when the collective pdgment
has embraced neither.
As mentioned above, the debate over the criminalization of feticide only parallels the abortion debate

in that the.moral status of human beings has been the central issue in both debates. Unlike the legal debate
over abortion, the legal debate over feticide need not center on the moral status of fetuses. Society must
attempt to determine the moral status of fetuses if it is to make abortion law because the policy of abortion
law involves balancing rights and interests. However, it is possible to for the criminal law to protect fetuses
without attempting to determine the moral status of fetuses because there is no balancing to be done. There
is an agnostic approach that advances the policy goals of the criminal law, including protecting the rights and
interests of both victims and defendants.

3. New Mexico: Feticide is a Criminal Assault o n a Pregnant Woman

?

Arkamas, Iowa, Wyoming and New Mexico classify feticide as crimina assault on a pregnant

F'

woman.% This discussion will focus on New Mexico's approach because the approaches of these four states
are very similar and because the author and potential readers probably have a particular interest in New

M-

law. None of these jurisdictions has a great deal of case law interpreting these statutes, and New

Msdco has only one published opiniofl so the discussion of will focus on the New Mexico statutes.

. .

New Mexico has two statutes cnrmnalizing injury to a pregnant woman. The first defines a Qime of

assault, called *Injury to [a] pregnant woman." It reads, "Inju~yto [a] pregnant woman consists of a person
other than the woman injuring a pregnant woman in the commission of a felony causing her to suffer a
miscarriage or stillbirth as a result of that injury."= A defendant who is convicted of "Injury to pregnant
woman" is guilty of a third degree felony, generally punished by three years impris0nment.W ?he second
statute defines a d

c offense, called "Injury to pregnant woman by vehicle." It reads, "Injuryto a pregnant

woman by vehicle is injury to a pregnant woman by a person other than the woman in the unlawful operation

of a motor vehicle causing her to suffer a miscaniage or stillbirth as a result of that injuty."Iw The

r,

classification of this crime and the corresponding punishment is less clear. According to the statutes, a
conviction for injury to a pregnant woman by vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or dtugs is .a third
degree felony, generally punishable by three years imprisonment.lol However, the statute does not specify the
classification of or penalty for injury to a pregnant woman by vehide where defendant is not under the
iduence of drugs or alcohol. This appears to be a legislative oversight, which needs to be c

o

d

There are a few suiking features of the New Mexico approach. First, New Mexico's statutes protect

fetuses and pregnant women without deciding whether fetuses are human beings. *Injury to [a] pregnant
woman" is the name of the crime, and an element of that crime is a result, the death of a fetus. The New

Mexico approach c r i m i n k feticide, attaching legal penalties to an act that society can agree should be

P,

%Arkcode Ann.,$ 5-13-201(A)(5)(Michie1991 Supp.). Iowa Code Ann $ 707.8 (West 1979). Wyo. Stat. § 62502(a)cv) (Supp.1988). N.M. Stat.Ann §§ 30-3-7,66-8-101.1(Michie 1987).
97 State v. Begay, 734 P.2d 278 (NMCtApp. 1983,which held that vehicular homiade and injwy to pregnant woman
do not merge.
98 N M Stat.Ann $30-3-7(A)
(Michie 1987).
99 N M Stat.Am. 9s 30-3-7(C),31-18-15(A)(5) (Michie 1987).
'"N.M.
Stat.Ann $ 668-101.1(A)(Michie 1987).
'01 N M Stat.Ann §$ 66-8-101.1(C),31-18-15(A)(5)(Mivlichie 1987).

punished. As discussed above, those who believe that fetuses are not human beings can accept that fetuses

?

and pregnant women should be entided to protection from the criminal law. In addition, those who believe
that fetuses are not human beings should be able to accept that society as a whole does not share their belief,
so that feticide should be c r b d i d but not equated with homicide. In shon, the New Mexico approach
embodies societal agnosticism with respect to the ethical status of fetuses, while affording them legal
proremion. Under the New Mexico approach, fetuses may or may not be human beings, but the aiminal law
extends its protection as far as society is wmfortable exrending it. The killing of a fetus is a crime against the
pregnant woman and against the fetus itself, regardless of whether that fetus is a human being. Because
society is uneasy punishing those grulty of feticide as it punishes murderers, the penalty and the stigma
attached to feticide fi~ljuryto a pregnant woman) is less severe than the penaty for homicide.
One criticism of New Mexico's approach might be that by not equating feticide and homicide, the

New Mexiw Legislature has determined that fetuses are not human beings and legislated accordingly. Put
differently,if killing a human being is always homicide, and killing a fetus is not homicide, then a fetus is not a
human being under New Mexico law. This criticism makes logical sense if one accepts the premise that the
law always speaks with finality and permanence,but that premise is false. The law reflects societal consensus
on a problem, and the law's solutions evolve as societal consensus wolves. The New Mexico approach
makes no judgment about the ethical status of fetuses because there is nothing close to societal consensus on
the issue. New Mexico's approach does make a judgment about an issue that society can agree on; it is
m o d y wrong to kiU a fetus against a pregnant woman's will, and the state has an interest in deterring such
behavior and p u n i s h it when it does occur. This approach takes a stand with respect to behavior that
society knows is morally wrong and harmful, but it also embraces agnosticism about the moral status of
fetuses rather than espousing a solution upon which society cannot begin to agree.
Another relevant feature of the New Mexico approach is that the statutes contain no independent
mens rea element, and one can imagine cases where this omission might lead to troublmg results. Because
the statutes are written like the felony-murder rule, the mens rea requirement for the underlymg felony is the
only mens rea required for conviction. The defendant need not know of the existence of the fetus to be

?

P

found &.

In addition, the statutes do not distinguish between viable and nonviable fetuses, so Justice

Mosk's argument about overly harsh results points to one problem with the New Mexiw statutes. A
defendant can be held c r i d d y liable for the death of a fetus that he did not know existed nor had any
reason to know existed. For srample, a defendant who is fleeing the scene of a felony on foot knocks down
a woman who is a few weeks pregnant, causing a d b i t t h . A New Mexico prosecutor might be able to
convict that defendant of injury to a pregnant woman, thereby tacking an addmod three years onto his or
her sentence.

In such cases, moral culpability and punishment are dispropo~tionate, but the

dispropomonalityis nowhere near the level possible under W o r n i a law.
The other significant problem with the New Mexiw approach is that it daws the line between injury
to pregnant woman and homicide arbiuarh/. Like the wmmon law born alive rule, the New Mexiw
approach draws that line at live bitth. A defendant whose acts cause the death of a fetus during the
commission of a felony can be convicted of i

n j j to a pregnant woman.

But a defendant whose acts cause

injuyto a fetus that is later born alive and then dies can be convicted of murder. Both the stigmatization and

,--

the punishment will depend on fortuity in some cases. However, all possible approaches are flawed in this
way, and the law must adopt the best choice despite imperfecdons.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper is to "plain the basic approaches to the problem of feticide in criminal
law and to evaluate those approaches. If that evaluation is'to be at all useful, it must not depend on
arguments that attempt to persuade the reader that fetuses are human beings or that they are not human
beings. Greater minds have spilled more ink and crafted more crystalhe prose in failed attempts to persuade
readers of these ~rofoundethical propositions. The task at hand is less ambitious. Given that society cannot
agree on the moral status of fetuses, are any of the existing approaches satisfactory to s o c i q as a whole? Are
any of the approaches acceptable to those who beliwe that fetuses are human beings and to those who
/-'

believe that they are not? Is there an approach that accords with socied XtitUdes about the m o d status of
fetuses?
The preceding discussion points out numerous fauh with the common law born alive approach and
the homicide approach. The born alive rule is probably outdated because one of the original reasons for its
existence was the i n a b i i of medical personnel to determine what caused the death of a fetus. In addition,
even those who believe that a

fetus is not a person until born alive can agree that feticide might be a crime,

although that crime is not homicide. It follows from those faults that the uiminal law must abandon the
born alive rule and criminalize feticide. However, treating feticide as homicide is not an acceptable solution,
prknady because it is an arrogant approach with frightening consequences. The homicide approach hazards
an answer wirh respect to the moral starus of fetuses and makes the lives and liberties of defendants depend
on that answer. The state must not gamble the life-long deprivation of liberty or the lives of its cidzens in

this way.
The discussion of the three basic approaches suggests that best approach classifies feticide as assault
on a pregnant woman, the approach taken by a small rninoriry of states, including New Mexico. That
approach is the best, but it is not perfect. The New Mexico approach suffers from an a r b i q line-drawing
infirmity, but that infirmity is not fatal because all approaches to this problem suffer from it. No matter
where one chooses to draw the line, some defendants will be exposed to greater uiminal liability and

stigmatization based on mere chance. In addition, the New Mexico approach does not contain an
independent mens rea element, which means that punishment and moral culpability will not always be
perfedy propomonate. The existing statutes should be amended to include a mens rea element, and any new
statutes modeled on the existing statutes should include a mens rea element.
Despite its imperfections, the New Mexico approach is best because it accepts societal agnosticism
with respect to the moral status of fetuses while adequady protecting the interests of victims and defendants.

This problem is not analogous to the abomon problem, so the criminal law need not take a position about
the moral stam of fetuses in order to protect them Society has not reached a consensus about whether
fetuses are human beings and it is not necessw to do so in order to protect victims and defendants. So there

0,

is absolutely no reason for the criminal law to foist a hotly contended ethical proposition upon its citizens

with so much at stake. If legislation need not embrace a contentious position on a profound ethical question,
then it should not do so. It is divisive to embrace one position or the other. In addition, it will cause a great
deal of un&ty

and i n c o h c y in the law. Adopting the agnostic approach has the advantage of

insulating the criminal fetiade debate from the abortion debate, which will inevitablylead to more certainty in
the law of individual states and more consistency in the laws of all the states. The debate over the moral
status of

fetuses will continue, of course, as it should, but criminal law is no place to experiment because lives

and liberty are at stake. By adopting the New Mexico approach, states can pursue sound criminal law policy
rather than confusiig their criminal law by legislatingunnecessady on a highly charged ethical issue. America
may never agree on the moral status of fetuses, but something closer to consensus must precede the criminal

law adopting a position on the issue. If a consensus emerges, then the criminal law should change its

approach to conform to that consensus. Until then, states should refrain from using the criminal law to give
legal force to any conclusion about whether fetuses are human beings.
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